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he total dollar value of output in Hampton Roads should exceed $65 billion in 2005. With a projected growth rate of 3.9
percent in 2005, the region’s economy will extend the pattern of faster-than-national-average growth it has experienced the
past five years. The region’s “real” (inflation-adjusted) average annual economic growth rate was a robust 4.1 percent per
year between 2001 and 2005. This was well above the 3.2 percent average we have experienced since 1970.
In this chapter, we’ll examine our regional economy in greater detail and compare it to other metropolitan areas. We’ll also




Hampton Roads has not experienced a year
of actual negative economic growth, or
recession, since 1975. In 2005, we expect
the value of the region’s gross regional
product (GRP) to increase to $65.2 billion
(see Table 1). During 2005, our economy
will grow at a 3.9 percent rate, after taking
inflation into account.  
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TABLE 1
HAMPTON ROADS GROSS REGIONAL PRODUCT (GRP)








1990 31.6 38.7 0.4
1991 33.02 39.10 1
1992 34.78 40.26 3.0
1993 36.40 41.18 2.3
1994 37.96 42.06 2.1
1995 38.90 42.23 0.4
1996 40.74 43.41 2.8
1997 42.72 44.78 3.1
1998 44.04 45.65 1.9
1999 46.22 47.22 3.5
2000 48.36 48.36 2.4
2001 51.00 49.80 3.0
2002 54.19 52.06 4.5
2003 57.50 54.43 4.5
2004 61.70 57.10 5.2
2005 65.20 59.30 3.9
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
Graph 1 illustrates that cumulative growth in Hampton Roads’ GRP since 2000 has been matched in only one other five-year
period since 1969. The past five years have been very good ones, economically speaking. It is worth noting that each of the
highest three five-year growth periods in the region’s economy over the past 35 years has been associated with rising defense
expenditures in Hampton Roads.  
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In each of the past five years, the Hampton Roads economy has outperformed that of the nation (see Graph 2). National growth
will average about 2.7 percent annually from 2001 to 2005, 1.4 percent per year below our 4.1 percent annual rate of
growth. However, the margin between these two growth rates has narrowed over the past two years as the national economy
has recovered and likely will shrink to zero in 2005.  
Graph 2 also shows that in three of the past five years economic growth in Hampton Roads exceeded that of the
Commonwealth, which grew much more rapidly than the nation. Hampton Roads will not grow as rapidly as Virginia in 2005,
but the region’s average growth rate between 2001 and 2005 will still be slightly larger than that of the Commonwealth.  
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GRAPH 2 
RATE OF GROWTH OF GDP (U.S.), GSP (VA.) 
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It is impressive that the value of our GRP now is larger than two-thirds of all the world’s economies, including
those of several European Union countries. Table 2 adjusts the value of the production of various countries and Hampton
Roads for purchasing-power parity – which essentially measures what one actually can buy with a particular sum of money. As
seen in Table 2, Hampton Roads’ 2003 GRP was approximately the same as the gross domestic products (GDP) of national
economies such as Syria, the Dominican Republic and Croatia. Hampton Roads’ GRP is about two-thirds that of New Zealand,
more than double that of Lebanon and five times that of Jamaica.
The latest U.S. Department of Commerce personal income data enable us to compare Hampton Roads to other metropolitan sta-
tistical areas (MSAs) in the United States. The metropolitan areas most comparable to Hampton Roads in terms of personal
income are Las Vegas, Orlando, San Antonio, Charlotte and Nashville.  
For those who are professional sports aficionados, Table 3 also provides some encouragement. Note that total personal income
in Hampton Roads is substantially larger than personal incomes in New Orleans, Jacksonville, Buffalo and Salt Lake City, all of
which host professional sports franchises.
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TABLE 2
2003 GROSS PRODUCT OF HAMPTON











Sources: World Bank and the Old Dominion University Economic
Forecasting Project
TABLE 3
HAMPTON ROADS AND COMPARABLE
METROPOLITAN AREAS TOTAL













Salt Lake City 29.9
Source: U.S. Department of Commence
Employment and Wages
With the onset of the national economic recession in 2001, many analysts and pundits expressed much concern about the
decline in high-paying manufacturing jobs in the United States. The new jobs that replaced the lost jobs, they lamented, paid
lower wages and did not carry significant fringe benefits. The quintessence of this development was said to be a stereotypical
job at a Wal-Mart.  
Whatever the accuracy of this story for the United States, it does not appear to be a fair representation of job market develop-
ments within Hampton Roads over the past few years. The growth in employment within our region in recent years has
been excellent. As Table 4 reveals, Hampton Roads enjoyed a 6 percent increase in employment between 1999
and 2004, four times the national average, and a 22.7 percent increase in average hourly wages overall (Table
5). But certain industries accounted for most of this increase. Data presented in Graph 3 show that information industries
experienced a 24.7 percent increase in employment, followed by education and health services with 14.9 percent. These
industries tend to employ people with relatively high levels of education. By contrast, jobs in retail trade, which typically require
less education, expanded by only 3.8 percent.
Graph 4 demonstrates that most of the jobs that were lost in recent years in Hampton Roads were in telecommunications and
manufacturing.  These job losses reflect national trends and largely reflect either rapidly rising productivity within these industries
that has reduced the demand for labor, or international competition from countries such as China and India. Nevertheless, during
this time period, jobs in manufacturing declined by 16.7 percent nationally, but only 6.8 percent, or 4,400 jobs, in Hampton
Roads.
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TABLE 4
PERCENT CHANGE IN PAYROLL











Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion
University Economic Forecasting Project
TABLE 5
PERCENT CHANGE IN AVERAGE
HOURLY WAGE FOR ALL OCCUPATIONS,











Sources: U.S. Department of Labor and the Old Dominion
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Whether measured by either the demand for hotel rooms or by total hotel revenue, growth in the Hampton Roads tourist industry
exceeded that of the nation between 1999 and 2004. Graph 5 shows that tourist revenue grew much faster than room occu-
pancy within the region, meaning that the typical tourist is spending more money. This reflects a gradual, but continuing trend
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GRAPH 5 
COMPARATIVE GROWTH OF HOTEL ROOM DEMAND 
AND TOTAL REVENUE FOR HAMPTON ROADS 
























Sources: Smith Travel Research and the Old Dominion University 
Economic Forecasting Project
toward upscale tourism within the region. By no means has Hampton Roads become an über destination such as Palm Beach;
however, over the past decade, it has tended to attract a greater proportion of higher-income tourists than previously.   
The significant increase in Hampton Roads tourism notwithstanding, Williamsburg has not benefited accordingly
and actually has been a drag on tourism growth in the region. Graph 6 illustrates the extent of the contraction in both
room demand and revenue experienced in the Williamsburg portion of the Hampton Roads tourist industry over the past five
years. According to data from Smith Travel Research and the Commonwealth of Virginia, total hotel revenue in the Williamsburg
market declined from $152 million in 1999 to $144 million in 2004. These data implicitly also underline the considerable
prosperity that Virginia Beach has experienced.   
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GRAPH 6 
GROWTH OF HOTEL ROOM DEMAND AND TOTAL 
REVENUE FOR THE WILLIAMSBURG PORTION OF THE 
























The decline of tourism in Williamsburg has led to a significant rearrangement of market shares within the Hampton Roads tourism
market. As Graph 7 illustrates, Williamsburg’s share of regional tourism dropped from 30 percent to 23 percent
between 1999 and 2004.
Poor weather during the summers of both 2003 and 2004 only accentuated Williamsburg’s existing marketing problems. These
problems include: (1) the diminishing ability of younger, non-historically oriented people to identify with Williamsburg’s attrac-
tions; (2) a lack of funding for a concerted marketing program, which in any case would be hobbled by an absence of consis-
tent data; and (3) less-than-optimal relations between the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation and Busch Gardens. All of these
concerns are being addressed to some extent. For example, Williamsburg did begin to levy a $2 per night hotel room tax in the
summer of 2004 in order to fund an expanded marketing and research program. 
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GRAPH 7 
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Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC)
Given the relative degree of reliance of our regional economy on defense spending (see Graph 8), few acronyms evoke more
angst in Hampton Roads than BRAC. Some of this worry is quite justifiable and is the result of past episodes of military down-
sizing. Table 6 discloses the economic impact of the two major downsizing episodes Hampton Roads has encountered since
Vietnam. The post-Cold War downsizing was particularly difficult; Hampton Roads lost more than 24 percent of its full-time mili-
tary personnel and 21 percent of its civilian labor force working for the Department of Defense. The Naval Air Rework Facility
on the Norfolk Naval Base and several functions within the Norfolk Naval Shipyard were lost. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE 2005 BRAC RECOMMENDATIONS
As this is written, we do not yet know what military facilities will be closed as a result of the 2005 Base Realignment and Closure
process. We can compute, however, the economic impact of the BRAC Commission recommendations that have been made. Unlike
the two previous downsizing periods described in Table 6, the 2005 round
of base closures is not likely to be accompanied by national-level force
reductions in the services. Of course, developments in Iraq and elsewhere
could change this. But, in the absence of major changes in overall military
expenditures, total military and civilian personnel levels are projected to be
fairly stable over the next five years. This implies that military or civilian per-
sonnel increases or decreases will result only from base consolidations or
closures, respectively.
The recommended Department of Defense 2005 list of base clo-
sures and consolidations would reduce employment in Hampton
Roads by 19,228 jobs. After accounting for both the direct and indirect
effects of the base closures and consolidations, the total job loss would
reduce employment in Hampton Roads by about 1.9 percent, if nothing
takes the place of these activities.
The financial impact of the 2005 BRAC Commission
recommendations is presented in Table 7. The closure
of Oceana Naval Air Station clearly represents
the largest negative impact, followed by Fort
Monroe.  The addition of jobs to the Norfolk
Naval Shipyard yields the greatest positive
effect on the region’s economy.
In terms of gross regional product, the net financial
effect of the base realignment will be significant than
the employment effect because many of the jobs lost
are relatively high-paying. We anticipate that two
years after the jobs are actually eliminated the
total impact of the BRAC recommendations will
be a GRP reduction of approximately $1.61 bil-
lion per year. This would amount to approxi-
mately 2.5 percent of the value of the region’s
annual gross output, if nothing were to take the
place of the terminated activities.
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TABLE 6
PERCENT REDUCTION IN MILITARY AND











Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
TABLE 7
BRAC CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON HAMPTON ROADS
GRP BY BASE LOCATION
Place Millions of Dollars
Fort Monroe -$575.7 M
Fort Eustis -295.8
Langley Air Force Base 114.9
Yorktown Naval Weapons Station -31.7
Oceana -1573.5
NOB 344.5
Naval Support Facility (Chesapeake) 114.2
Portsmouth Naval Hospital -64.2
Little Creek 6.5
Norfolk Naval Shipyard 350.0
(Loss)Total - 1610.8 M
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 8 
THE PROPORTION OF HAMPTON ROADS' GROSS REGIONAL 
PRODUCT ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPENDING 
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Graph 9 displays estimates of the total economic effects, both direct and indirect, of BRAC on the Peninsula and Southside.
These estimates employ a statistical model that takes into account commuting between the two sub-regions of Hampton Roads.
The Southside is the bigger loser in absolute terms, though relatively speaking the adverse effect on the Peninsula is much greater
because its economic base is only about one-half of that of the Southside. There is relatively little intraregional transfer of military
activity contained in the BRAC recommendations.  
OCEANA NAVAL AIR STATION
Oceana Naval Air Station was not on the original BRAC list, but was added by the commission during its July 2005 delibera-
tions. Without doubt, it is the centerpiece of the 2005 BRAC process in Hampton Roads because its economic impact is so sub-
stantial. The interaction of Oceana with the Virginia Beach community long has been an issue of substance and this was once
again brought to the fore during this year’s BRAC proceedings. Residential and commercial development around the base plus
community concerns about jet noise have combined to limit the Navy’s ability to operate or expand the facility. Even if this BRAC
process ultimately does not target Oceana for closing, then when the Navy adopts its next generation of fighter aircraft, it prob-
ably will decide to locate some or all of the new wings elsewhere. Hence, whatever the BRAC outcome this time around,
Oceana’s future in Hampton Roads is in jeopardy. 
In terms of total jobs lost and GRP forgone, what would the economic impact be if Oceana were closed and all of its operations
moved to another state? Table 8 projects this possibility, and finds the impact quite large. An estimated $1.6 billion in GRP
(about 2.5 percent of the region’s GRP) would
be lost to Hampton Roads, as well as more
than 19,000 jobs (about 1.9 percent), if
Oceana were to close. This is very close to our
estimate of the overall impact of this BRAC
process on the region. In other words, if all of
the other BRAC recommendations were imple-
mented, they would almost cancel each other
in terms of their economic impact. 
A WORD OF CAUTION ABOUT INTERPRETING BASE CLOSURE ECONOMIC IMPACTS
The above data on base closures are best interpreted as an answer to the question, “What would happen to the regional
economy if a base such as Fort Monroe or Oceana Naval Air Station were shut down completely and no substitute economic
activity utilized the empty facilities?” Whether a closed base can be used for other purposes is not part of the analysis, but realis-
tically should be. 
State and federal governments nearly always make development and economic adjustment commitments to cushion the eco-
nomic impact of base closures. Private entrepreneurs nearly always come forward with creative ideas about how to utilize the
facilities and land inside closed bases. If nothing else, for example, Oceana would constitute a prime location for residential
housing. Fort Monroe similarly has potentially productive civilian uses. A May 2005 General Accounting Office study, “Military
Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC Rounds,” found that after a period of 10 years almost 85 percent of
the civilian jobs lost to previous BRAC-mandated base closures had been replaced by developments on the closed bases.
However, the report advised, “The recovery process has not necessarily been easy.” Thus, base closures need not be disas-
trous if localities, regions and states are innovative and entrepreneurial with respect to their post-closure plans.
Needless to say, the quality and energy of our regional leadership will be absolutely critical. This will be the equivalent of a
leadership Super Bowl — one that will test the courage and ingenuity of all of those who guide our regional institutions.
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TABLE 8
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT ON GRP AND EMPLOYMENT
IN HAMPTON ROADS FROM CLOSING
THE OCEANA NAVAL AIR STATION
Total (Direct and Indirect)
Loss in GRP $1,573,480,000
Total (Direct and Indirect)
Loss in Employment 19,024
Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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GRAPH 9 
2005 BRAC ESTIMATED AGGREGATE ECONOMIC IMPACT 















Source: Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
M
ill
io
ns
$
